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Is TENNESSEE V. GARNER STILL THE LAW?
Eric M. Ziporin and Elliot J. Scott
Since 1985, it would be hard to find any police cadet who did not receive training at the
police academy on Tennessee v. Garner]. Lower courts and commentators consistently
believed that Garner dramatically altered the "use of force" landscape by prohibiting the use of
deadly force on a fleeing suspect unless the suspect posed a significant threat of death or
serious bodily injury to the police or others.
However, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Scott v. Harris significantly
clarified the Fourth Amendment standard for claims of excessive force arising under federal
law.2 Though the case most directly affects police pursuits, Harris also gave lower courts explicit
directions in applying the Fourth Amendment more generally. In Harris, the plaintiff asserted that
the officer's actions in terminating the pursuit with deadly force had to be analyzed under the
standard in Garner.3 Citing Garner, the plaintiff alleged that certain "preconditions" had to be
met before the officer could prevail under the Fourth Amendment: (1) that the suspect must
have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others; (2) deadly
force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3) where feasible, the officer must
have given the suspect some warning.4
The Supreme Court rejected this rigid application of its previous excessive force case law,
and noted that there was no "magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever
an officer's actions constitute deadly force."5 The Supreme Court contrasted Garner with the
facts in Harris noting that the threat posed by an unarmed suspect on foot is not remotely
comparable to the level of danger posed to the public and police officers by a suspect fleeing
recklessly in a vehicle.6
The Supreme Court ruled that, when analyzing an officer's conduct in an excessive force
case arising out of a vehicular pursuit, lower courts must weigh the risk posed by the officer's
conduct against the threat posed by the suspect.7 Thus, the Court considered that the plaintiff
in Harris intentionally placed both himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in a
reckless high-speed chase.8 The Court noted that those who could have been harmed by the
fleeing suspect were innocent, and the suspect had engaged in intentionally criminal conduct.9
With sweeping language, the Supreme Court held that an "officer's attempt to terminate a
dangerous high-speed vehicle pursuit that threatens the lives of the public does not violate the
Fourth Amendment," even when the attempt places the suspect at risk of serious injury or
death. 10
There is good reason to believe that Garner has been all but cast aside as a tool for
analyzing any excessive force case except those with identical facts. In a recent decision by
the federal District Court in Colorado, Chief Judge Edward W. Nottingham noted that it would
be error to assume that Garner remains the law governing the use of deadly force.11 In
Cordova, a lengthy pursuit ended when the driver drove his truck and trailer the wrong way
down an interstate highway at night.12 The officer, who was ahead of the driver attempting to
I Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
2 Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007).
3 Id. at 1777.
4 Id.
5 /d.
6 Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)) (citations omitted).
7 Id. at 1778.
8 Id.
9Harris, 127 S.Ct. at 1778.
i0 id.
II Cordova v. Aragon, 560 F.Supp. 2d 1041, 1063 (D. Colo. May 20, 2008).
12 Id. at 1043-48.
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deploy stop sticks, was caught in the roadway with the truck headed in his direction. 13 The
officer fired his weapon at the truck as it approached and passed him, killing the driver with a
bullet that entered the side of the truck.14
The court dismissed the case against the officer by applying Harris. 15 Judge Nottingham
concluded that, regardless of whether the officer was in personal danger when he fired the fatal
shot, the threat the driver posed to innocent motorists and other police officers was so great that
deadly force was warranted. 16 In so ruling, Judge Nottingham noted that in Harris, the Supreme
Court suggested that Garner is "utterly unpersuasive authority" when considering the
reasonableness of the force used in terminating a police pursuit.17
The implications of Harris are therefore far-reaching, not only in the context of police
pursuits, but also in the analysis of deadly force cases generally. Avoiding rigid tests or
preconditions, the Supreme Court has given direction to the lower courts to assess the objective
reasonableness of the use of deadly force under the traditional "totality of the circumstances"
analysis. Equally important, Harris instructs the lower courts to weigh, in the totality of
circumstances, the relative culpability of the parties and the contrasting threat of injury to the
suspect, the officer, and the public. This dramatically diminishes the utility of Garner in analyzing
use of force issues, while reaffirming the essential Fourth Amendment requirement:
reasonableness in light of the situation confronted by the officer.
13 Id. at 1044-46.
14 Id. at 1046.
i
5 /d. at 1051-65.
16 Cordova, 560 F.Supp. 2d at 1058-59.
17 Id. at 1063.
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